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Abstract
We study revenue optimization learning algorithms for posted-price auctions with
strategic buyers. We analyze a very broad family of monotone regret minimization
algorithms for this problem, which includes the previously best known algorithm,
and show that no algorithm in that family admits a strategic regret more favorable
than Ω(
√
T ). We then introduce a new algorithm that achieves a strategic regret
differing from the lower bound only by a factor in O(log T ), an exponential im-
provement upon the previous best algorithm. Our new algorithm admits a natural
analysis and simpler proofs, and the ideas behind its design are general. We also
report the results of empirical evaluations comparing our algorithm with the pre-
vious state of the art and show a consistent exponential improvement in several
different scenarios.
1 Introduction
Auctions have long been an active area of research in Economics and Game Theory [Vickrey, 2012,
Milgrom and Weber, 1982, Ostrovsky and Schwarz, 2011]. In the past decade, however, the advent
of online advertisement has prompted a more algorithmic study of auctions, including the design of
learning algorithms for revenue maximization for generalized second-price auctions or second-price
auctions with reserve [Cesa-Bianchi et al., 2013, Mohri and Mun˜oz Medina, 2014, He et al., 2013].
These studies have been largely motivated by the widespread use of AdExchanges and the vast
amount of historical data thereby collected – AdExchanges are advertisement selling platforms us-
ing second-price auctions with reserve price to allocate advertisement space. Thus far, the learning
algorithms proposed for revenue maximization in these auctions critically rely on the assumption
that the bids, that is, the outcomes of auctions, are drawn i.i.d. according to some unknown distri-
bution. However, this assumption may not hold in practice. In particular, with the knowledge that a
revenue optimization algorithm is being used, an advertiser could seek to mislead the publisher by
under-bidding. In fact, consistent empirical evidence of strategic behavior by advertisers has been
found by Edelman and Ostrovsky [2007]. This motivates the analysis presented in this paper of the
interactions between sellers and strategic buyers, that is, buyers that may act non-truthfully with the
goal of maximizing their surplus.
The scenario we consider is that of posted-price auctions, which, albeit simpler than other mech-
anisms, in fact matches a common situation in AdExchanges where many auctions admit a single
bidder. In this setting, second-price auctions with reserve are equivalent to posted-price auctions: a
seller sets a reserve price for a good and the buyer decides whether or not to accept it (that is to bid
higher than the reserve price). In order to capture the buyer’s strategic behavior, we will analyze an
online scenario: at each time t, a price pt is offered by the seller and the buyer must decide to either
accept it or leave it. This scenario can be modeled as a two-player repeated non-zero sum game with
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incomplete information, where the seller’s objective is to maximize his revenue, while the advertiser
seeks to maximize her surplus as described in more detail in Section 2.
The literature on non-zero sum games is very rich [Nachbar, 1997, 2001, Morris, 1994], but much of
the work in that area has focused on characterizing different types of equilibria, which is not directly
relevant to the algorithmic questions arising here. Furthermore, the problem we consider admits a
particular structure that can be exploited to design efficient revenue optimization algorithms.
From the seller’s perspective, this game can also be viewed as a bandit problem [Kuleshov and Pre-
cup, 2010, Robbins, 1985] since only the revenue (or reward) for the prices offered is accessible to
the seller. Kleinberg and Leighton [2003] precisely studied this continuous bandit setting under the
assumption of an oblivious buyer, that is, one that does not exploit the seller’s behavior (more pre-
cisely, the authors assume that at each round the seller interacts with a different buyer). The authors
presented a tight regret bound of Θ(log log T ) for the scenario of a buyer holding a fixed valuation
and a regret bound of O(T
2
3 ) when facing an adversarial buyer by using an elegant reduction to a
discrete bandit problem. However, as argued by Amin et al. [2013], when dealing with a strategic
buyer, the usual definition of regret is no longer meaningful. Indeed, consider the following exam-
ple: let the valuation of the buyer be given by v ∈ [0, 1] and assume that an algorithm with sublinear
regret such as Exp3 [Auer et al., 2002b] or UCB [Auer et al., 2002a] is used for T rounds by the
seller. A possible strategy for the buyer, knowing the seller’s algorithm, would be to accept prices
only if they are smaller than some small value , certain that the seller would eventually learn to offer
only prices less than . If   v, the buyer would considerably boost her surplus while, in theory,
the seller would have not incurred a large regret since in hindsight, the best fixed strategy would
have been to offer price  for all rounds. This, however is clearly not optimal for the seller. The
stronger notion of policy regret introduced by Arora et al. [2012] has been shown to be the appro-
priate one for the analysis of bandit problems with adaptive adversaries. However, for the example
just described, a sublinear policy regret can be similarly achieved. Thus, this notion of regret is also
not the pertinent one for the study of our scenario.
We will adopt instead the definition of strategic-regret, which was introduced by Amin et al. [2013]
precisely for the study of this problem. This notion of regret also matches the concept of learning
loss introduced by [Agrawal, 1995] when facing an oblivious adversary. Using this definition, Amin
et al. [2013] presented both upper and lower bounds for the regret of a seller facing a strategic
buyer and showed that the buyer’s surplus must be discounted over time in order to be able to
achieve sublinear regret (see Section 2). However, the gap between the upper and lower bounds
they presented is in O(
√
T ). In the following, we analyze a very broad family of monotone regret
minimization algorithms for this problem (Section 3), which includes the algorithm of Amin et al.
[2013], and show that no algorithm in that family admits a strategic regret more favorable than
Ω(
√
T ). Next, we introduce a nearly-optimal algorithm that achieves a strategic regret differing
from the lower bound at most by a factor in O(log T ) (Section 4). This represents an exponential
improvement upon the existing best algorithm for this setting. Our new algorithm admits a natural
analysis and simpler proofs. A key idea behind its design is a method deterring the buyer from lying,
that is rejecting prices below her valuation.
2 Setup
We consider the following game played by a buyer and a seller. A good, such as an advertisement
space, is repeatedly offered for sale by the seller to the buyer over T rounds. The buyer holds a
private valuation v ∈ [0, 1] for that good. At each round t = 1, . . . , T , a price pt is offered by the
seller and a decision at ∈ {0, 1} is made by the buyer. at takes value 1 when the buyer accepts
to buy at that price, 0 otherwise. We will say that a buyer lies whenever at = 0 while pt < v.
At the beginning of the game, the algorithm A used by the seller to set prices is announced to the
buyer. Thus, the buyer plays strategically against this algorithm. The knowledge of A is a standard
assumption in mechanism design and also matches the practice in AdExchanges.
For any γ ∈ (0, 1), define the discounted surplus of the buyer as follows:
Sur(A, v) =
T∑
t=1
γt−1at(v − pt). (1)
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The value of the discount factor γ indicates the strength of the preference of the buyer for current
surpluses versus future ones. The performance of a seller’s algorithm is measured by the notion of
strategic-regret [Amin et al., 2013] defined as follows:
Reg(A, v) = Tv −
T∑
t=1
atpt. (2)
The buyer’s objective is to maximize his discounted surplus, while the seller seeks to minimize his
regret. Note that, in view of the discounting factor γ, the buyer is not fully adversarial. The problem
consists of designing algorithms achieving sublinear strategic regret (that is a regret in o(T )).
The motivation behind the definition of strategic-regret is straightforward: a seller, with access to
the buyer’s valuation, can set a fixed price for the good  close to this value. The buyer, having no
control on the prices offered, has no option but to accept this price in order to optimize his utility.
The revenue per round of the seller is therefore v−. Since there is no scenario where higher revenue
can be achieved, this is a natural setting to compare the performance of our algorithm.
To gain more intuition about the problem, let us examine some of the complications arising when
dealing with a strategic buyer. Suppose the seller attempts to learn the buyer’s valuation v by per-
forming a binary search. This would be a natural algorithm when facing a truthful buyer. However,
in view of the buyer’s knowledge of the algorithm, for γ  0, it is in her best interest to lie on the
initial rounds, thereby quickly, in fact exponentially, decreasing the price offered by the seller. The
seller would then incur an Ω(T ) regret. A binary search approach is therefore “too aggressive”. In-
deed, an untruthful buyer can manipulate the seller into offering prices less than v/2 by lying about
her value even just once! This discussion suggests following a more conservative approach. In the
next section, we discuss a natural family of conservative algorithms for this problem.
3 Monotone algorithms
The following conservative pricing strategy was introduced by Amin et al. [2013]. Let p1 = 1
and β < 1. If price pt is rejected at round t, the lower price pt+1 = βpt is offered at the next
round. If at any time price pt is accepted, then this price is offered for all the remaining rounds. We
will denote this algorithm by monotone. The motivation behind its design is clear: for a suitable
choice of β, the seller can slowly decrease the prices offered, thereby pressing the buyer to reject
many prices (which is not convenient for her) before obtaining a favorable price. The authors present
an O(Tγ
√
T ) regret bound for this algorithm, with Tγ = 1/(1− γ). A more careful analysis shows
that this bound can be further tightened to O(
√
TγT +
√
T ) when the discount factor γ is known to
the seller.
Despite its sublinear regret, the monotone algorithm remains sub-optimal for certain choices of
γ. Indeed, consider a scenario with γ  1. For this setting, the buyer would no longer have an
incentive to lie, thus, an algorithm such as binary search would achieve logarithmic regret, while the
regret achieved by the monotone algorithm is only guaranteed to be in O(
√
T ).
One may argue that the monotone algorithm is too specific since it admits a single parameter
β and that perhaps a more complex algorithm with the same monotonic idea could achieve a more
favorable regret. Let us therefore analyze a generic monotone algorithmAm defined by Algorithm 1.
Definition 1. For any buyer’s valuation v ∈ [0, 1], define the acceptance time κ∗ = κ∗(v) as the
first time a price offered by the seller using algorithm Am is accepted.
Proposition 1. For any decreasing sequence of prices (pt)Tt=1, there exists a truthful buyer with
valuation v0 such that algorithm Am suffers regret of at least
Reg(Am, v0) ≥ 1
4
√
T −
√
T .
Proof. By definition of the regret, we have Reg(Am, v) = vκ∗ + (T − κ∗)(v − pκ∗). We can
consider two cases: κ∗(v0) >
√
T for some v0 ∈ [1/2, 1] and κ∗(v) ≤
√
T for every v ∈ [1/2, 1].
In the former case, we have Reg(Am, v0) ≥ v0
√
T ≥ 12
√
T , which implies the statement of the
proposition. Thus, we can assume the latter condition.
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Algorithm 1 Family of monotone algorithms.
Let p1 = 1 and pt ≤ pt−1 for t = 2, . . . T .
t← 1
p← pt
Offer price p
while (Buyer rejects p) and (t < T ) do
t← t+ 1
p← pt
Offer price p
end while
while (t < T ) do
t← t+ 1
Offer price p
end while
Algorithm 2 Definition of Ar .
n = the root of T (T )
while Offered prices less than T do
Offer price pn
if Accepted then
n = r(n)
else
Offer price pn for r rounds
n = l(n)
end if
end while
Let v be uniformly distributed over [ 12 , 1]. In view of Lemma 4 (see Appendix 8.1), we have
E[vκ∗] + E[(T − κ∗)(v − pκ∗)] ≥ 1
2
E[κ∗] + (T −
√
T )E[(v − pκ∗)] ≥ 1
2
E[κ∗] +
T −√T
32E[κ∗]
.
The right-hand side is minimized for E[κ∗] =
√
T−√T
4 . Plugging in this value yields
E[Reg(Am, v)] ≥
√
T−√T
4 , which implies the existence of v0 with Reg(Am, v0) ≥
√
T−√T
4 .
We have thus shown that any monotone algorithmAm suffers a regret of at least Ω(
√
T ), even when
facing a truthful buyer. A tighter lower bound can be given under a mild condition on the prices
offered.
Definition 2. A sequence (pt)Tt=1 is said to be convex if it verifies pt − pt+1 ≥ pt+1 − pt+2 for
t = 1, . . . , T − 2.
An instance of a convex sequence is given by the prices offered by the monotone algorithm. A
seller offering prices forming a decreasing convex sequence seeks to control the number of lies of
the buyer by slowly reducing prices. The following proposition gives a lower bound on the regret of
any algorithm in this family.
Proposition 2. Let (pt)Tt=1 be a decreasing convex sequence of prices. There exists a valuation v0
for the buyer such that the regret of the monotone algorithm defined by these prices is Ω(
√
TCγ +√
T ), where Cγ = γ2(1−γ) .
The full proof of this proposition is given in Appendix 8.1. The proposition shows that when the
discount factor γ is known, the monotone algorithm is in fact asymptotically optimal in its class.
The results just presented suggest that the dependency on T cannot be improved by any monotone
algorithm. In some sense, this family of algorithms is “too conservative”. Thus, to achieve a more
favorable regret guarantee, an entirely different algorithmic idea must be introduced. In the next
section, we describe a new algorithm that achieves a substantially more advantageous strategic regret
by combining the fast convergence properties of a binary search-type algorithm (in a truthful setting)
with a method penalizing untruthful behaviors of the buyer.
4 A nearly optimal algorithm
Let A be an algorithm for revenue optimization used against a truthful buyer. Denote by T (T ) the
tree associated to A after T rounds. That is, T (T ) is a full tree of height T with nodes n ∈ T (T )
labeled with the prices pn offered by A. The right and left children of n are denoted by r(n) and
l(n) respectively. The price offered when pn is accepted by the buyer is the label of r(n) while the
price offered by A if pn is rejected is the label of l(n). Finally, we will denote the left and right
subtrees rooted at node n byL (n) andR(n) respectively. Figure 1 depicts the tree generated by an
algorithm proposed by Kleinberg and Leighton [2003], which we will describe later.
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Figure 1: (a) TreeT (3) associated to the algorithm proposed in [Kleinberg and Leighton, 2003]. (b) Modified
tree T ′(3) with r = 2.
Since the buyer holds a fixed valuation, we will consider algorithms that increase prices only after a
price is accepted and decrease it only after a rejection. This is formalized in the following definition.
Definition 3. An algorithm A is said to be consistent if maxn′∈L (n) pn′ ≤ pn ≤ minn′∈R(n) pn′
for any node n ∈ T (T ).
For any consistent algorithm A, we define a modified algorithm Ar, parametrized by an integer
r ≥ 1, designed to face strategic buyers. Algorithm Ar offers the same prices as A, but it is defined
with the following modification: when a price is rejected by the buyer, the seller offers the same
price for r rounds. The pseudocode of Ar is given in Algorithm 2. The motivation behind the
modified algorithm is given by the following simple observation: a strategic buyer will lie only if
she is certain that rejecting a price will boost her surplus in the future. By forcing the buyer to reject
a price for several rounds, the seller ensures that the future discounted surplus will be negligible,
thereby coercing the buyer to be truthful.
We proceed to formally analyze algorithm Ar. In particular, we will quantify the effect of the
parameter r on the choice of the buyer’s strategy. To do so, a measure of the spread of the prices
offered by Ar is needed.
Definition 4. For any node n ∈ T (T ) define the right increment of n as δrn := pr(n)−pn. Similarly,
define its left increment to be δln := maxn′∈L (n) pn − pn′ .
The prices offered by Ar define a path in T (T ). For each node in this path, we can define time
t(n) to be the number of rounds needed for this node to be reached by Ar. Note that, since r may
be greater than 1, the path chosen by Ar might not necessarily reach the leaves of T (T ). Finally,
let S : n 7→ S(n) be the function representing the surplus obtained by the buyer when playing an
optimal strategy against Ar after node n is reached.
Lemma 1. The function S satisfies the following recursive relation:
S(n) = max(γt(n)−1(v − pn) + S(r(n)),S(l(n))). (3)
Proof. Define a weighted tree T ′(T ) ⊂ T (T ) of nodes reachable by algorithm Ar. We assign
weights to the edges in the following way: if an edge on T ′(T ) is of the form (n, r(n)), its weight
is set to be γt(n)−1(v − pn), otherwise, it is set to 0. It is easy to see that the function S evaluates
the weight of the longest path from node n to the leafs of T ′(T ). It thus follows from elementary
graph algorithms that equation (3) holds.
The previous lemma immediately gives us necessary conditions for a buyer to reject a price.
Proposition 3. For any reachable node n, if price pn is rejected by the buyer, then the following
inequality holds:
v − pn < γ
r
(1− γ)(1− γr) (δ
l
n + γδ
r
n).
Proof. A direct implication of Lemma 1 is that price pn will be rejected by the buyer if and only if
γt(n)−1(v − pn) + S(r(n)) < S(l(n)). (4)
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However, by definition, the buyer’s surplus obtained by following any path in R(n) is bounded
above by S(r(n)). In particular, this is true for the path which rejects pr(n) and accepts every price
afterwards. The surplus of this path is given by
∑T
t=t(n)+r+1 γ
t−1(v − p̂t) where (p̂t)Tt=t(n)+r+1
are the prices the seller would offer if price pr(n) were rejected. Furthermore, since algorithm Ar is
consistent, we must have p̂t ≤ pr(n) = pn + δrn. Therefore, S(r(n)) can be bounded as follows:
S(r(n)) ≥
T∑
t=t(n)+r+1
γt−1(v − pn − δrn) =
γt(n)+r − γT
1− γ (v − pn − δ
r
n). (5)
We proceed to upper bound S(l(n)). Since pn − p′n ≤ δln for all n′ ∈ L (n), v − pn′ ≤ v − pn + δln
and
S(l(n)) ≤
T∑
t=tn+r
γt−1(v − pn + δln) =
γt(n)+r−1 − γT
1− γ (v − pn + δ
l
n). (6)
Combining inequalities (4), (5) and (6) we conclude that
γt(n)−1(v − pn) + γ
t(n)+r − γT
1− γ (v − pn − δ
r
n) ≤
γt(n)+r−1 − γT
1− γ (v − pn + δ
l
n)
⇒ (v − pn)
(
1 +
γr+1 − γr
1− γ
)
≤ γ
rδln + γ
r+1δrn − γT−t(n)+1(δrn + δln)
1− γ
⇒ (v − pn)(1− γr) ≤ γ
r(δln + γδ
r
n)
1− γ .
Rearranging the terms in the above inequality yields the desired result.
Let us consider the following instantiation of algorithm A introduced in [Kleinberg and Leighton,
2003]. The algorithm keeps track of a feasible interval [a, b] initialized to [0, 1] and an increment
parameter  initialized to 1/2. The algorithm works in phases. Within each phase, it offers prices
a + , a + 2, . . . until a price is rejected. If price a + k is rejected, then a new phase starts with
the feasible interval set to [a+ (k− 1), a+ k] and the increment parameter set to 2. This process
continues until b − a < 1/T at which point the last phase starts and price a is offered for the
remaining rounds. It is not hard to see that the number of phases needed by the algorithm is less
than dlog2 log2 T e+1. A more surprising fact is that this algorithm has been shown to achieve regret
O(log log T ) when the seller faces a truthful buyer. We will show that the modification Ar of this
algorithm admits a particularly favorable regret bound. We will call this algorithm PFSr (penalized
fast search algorithm).
Proposition 4. For any value of v ∈ [0, 1] and any γ ∈ (0, 1), the regret of algorithm PFSr admits
the following upper bound:
Reg(PFSr, v) ≤ (vr + 1)(dlog2 log2 T e+ 1) +
(1 + γ)γrT
2(1− γ)(1− γr) . (7)
Note that for r = 1 and γ → 0 the upper bound coincides with that of [Kleinberg and Leighton,
2003].
Proof. Algorithm PFSr can accumulate regret in two ways: the price offered pn is rejected, in which
case the regret is v, or the price is accepted and its regret is v − pn.
Let K = dlog2 log2 T e + 1 be the number of phases run by algorithm PFSr. Since at most K
different prices are rejected by the buyer (one rejection per phase) and each price must be rejected
for r rounds, the cumulative regret of all rejections is upper bounded by vKr.
The second type of regret can also be bounded straightforwardly. For any phase i, let i and [ai, bi]
denote the corresponding search parameter and feasible interval respectively. If v ∈ [ai, bi], the
regret accrued in the case where the buyer accepts a price in this interval is bounded by bi−ai = √i.
If, on the other hand v ≥ bi, then it readily follows that v − pn < v − bi + √i for all prices pn
offered in phase i. Therefore, the regret obtained in acceptance rounds is bounded by
K∑
i=1
Ni
(
(v − bi)1v>bi +
√
i
)
≤
K∑
i=1
(v − bi)1v>biNi +K,
6
where Ni ≤ 1√i denotes the number of prices offered during the i-th round.
Finally, notice that, in view of the algorithm’s definition, every bi corresponds to a rejected price.
Thus, by Proposition 3, there exist nodes ni (not necessarily distinct) such that pni = bi and
v − bi = v − pni ≤
γr
(1− γ)(1− γr) (δ
l
ni + γδ
r
ni).
It is immediate that δrn ≤ 1/2 and δln ≤ 1/2 for any node n, thus, we can write
K∑
i=1
(v − bi)1v>biNi ≤
γr(1 + γ)
2(1− γ)(1− γr)
K∑
i=1
Ni ≤ γ
r(1 + γ)
2(1− γ)(1− γr)T.
The last inequality holds since at most T prices are offered by our algorithm. Combining the bounds
for both regret types yields the result.
When an upper bound on the discount factor γ is known to the seller, he can leverage this information
and optimize upper bound (7) with respect to the parameter r.
Theorem 1. Let 1/2 < γ < γ0 < 1 and r∗ =
⌈
argminr≥1 r +
γr0T
(1−γ0)(1−γr0 )
⌉
. For any v ∈ [0, 1],
if T > 4, the regret of PFSr∗ satisfies
Reg(PFSr∗ , v) ≤ (2vγ0Tγ0 log cT + 1 + v)(log2 log2 T + 1) + 4Tγ0 ,
where c = 4 log 2.
The proof of this theorem is fairly technical and is deferred to the Appendix. The theorem helps
us define conditions under which logarithmic regret can be achieved. Indeed, if γ0 = e−1/ log T =
O(1− 1log T ), using the inequality e−x ≤ 1− x+ x2/2 valid for all x > 0 we obtain
1
1− γ0 ≤
log2 T
2 log T − 1 ≤ log T.
It then follows from Theorem 1 that
Reg(PFSr∗ , v) ≤ (2v log T log cT + 1 + v)(log2 log2 T + 1) + 4 log T.
Let us compare the regret bound given by Theorem 1 with the one given by Amin et al. [2013]. The
above discussion shows that for certain values of γ, an exponentially better regret can be achieved
by our algorithm. It can be argued that the knowledge of an upper bound on γ is required, whereas
this is not needed for the monotone algorithm. However, if γ > 1 − 1/√T , the regret bound
on monotone is super-linear, and therefore uninformative. Thus, in order to properly compare
both algorithms, we may assume that γ < 1 − 1/√T in which case, by Theorem 1, the regret
of our algorithm is O(
√
T log T ) whereas only linear regret can be guaranteed by the monotone
algorithm. Even under the more favorable bound of O(
√
TγT +
√
T ), for any α < 1 and γ <
1 − 1/Tα, the monotone algorithm will achieve regret O(T α+12 ) while a strictly better regret
O(Tα log T log log T ) is attained by ours.
5 Lower bound
The following lower bounds have been derived in previous work.
Theorem 2 ([Amin et al., 2013]). Let γ > 0 be fixed. For any algorithm A, there exists a valuation
v for the buyer such that Reg(A, v) ≥ 112Tγ .
This theorem is in fact given for the stochastic setting where the buyer’s valuation is a random
variable taken from some fixed distribution D. However, the proof of the theorem selects D to be a
point mass, therefore reducing the scenario to a fixed priced setting.
Theorem 3 ( [Kleinberg and Leighton, 2003]). Given any algorithm A to be played against a
truthful buyer, there exists a value v ∈ [0, 1] such that Reg(A, v) ≥ C log log T for some universal
constant C.
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Figure 2: Comparison of the monotone algorithm and PFSr for different choices of γ and v. The regret of
each algorithm is plotted as a function of the number rounds when γ is not known to the algorithms (first two
figures) and when its value is made accessible to the algorithms (last two figures).
Combining these results leads immediately to the following.
Corollary 1. Given any algorithm A, there exists a buyer’s valuation v ∈ [0, 1] such that
Reg(A, v) ≥ max
(
1
12Tγ , C log log T
)
, for a universal constant C.
We now compare the upper bounds given in the previous section with the bound of Corollary 1. For
γ > 1/2, we have Reg(PFSr, v) = O(Tγ log T log log T ). On the other hand, for γ ≤ 1/2, we may
choose r = 1, in which case, by Proposition 4, Reg(PFSr, v) = O(log log T ). Thus, the upper and
lower bounds match up to an O(log T ) factor.
6 Empirical results
In this section, we present the result of simulations comparing the monotone algorithm and our
algorithm PFSr. The experiments were carried out as follows: given a buyer’s valuation v, a discrete
set of false valuations v̂ were selected out of the set {.03, .06, . . . , v}. Both algorithms were run
against a buyer making the seller believe her valuation is v̂ instead of v. The value of v̂ achieving
the best utility for the buyer was chosen and the regret for both algorithms is reported in Figure 2.
We considered two sets of experiments. First, the value of parameter γ was left unknown to both
algorithms and the value of r was set to log(T ). This choice is motivated by the discussion following
Theorem 1 since, for large values of T , we can expect to achieve logarithmic regret. The first two
plots (from left to right) in Figure 2 depict these results. The apparent stationarity in the regret of
PFSr is just a consequence of the scale of the plots as the regret is in fact growing as log(T ). For
the second set of experiments, we allowed access to the parameter γ to both algorithms. The value
of r was chosen optimally based on the results of Theorem 1 and the parameter β of monotone
was set to 1 − 1/√TTγ to ensure regret in O(√TTγ + √T ). It is worth noting that even though
our algorithm was designed under the assumption of some knowledge about the value of γ, the
experimental results show that an exponentially better performance over the monotone algorithm
is still attainable and in fact the performances of the optimized and unoptimized versions of our
algorithm are comparable. A more comprehensive series of experiments is presented in Appendix 9.
7 Conclusion
We presented a detailed analysis of revenue optimization algorithms against strategic buyers. In
doing so, we reduced the gap between upper and lower bounds on strategic regret to a logarithmic
factor. Furthermore, the algorithm we presented is simple to analyze and reduces to the truthful
scenario in the limit of γ → 0, an important property that previous algorithms did not admit. We
believe that our analysis helps gain a deeper understanding of this problem and that it can serve as a
tool for studying more complex scenarios such as that of strategic behavior in repeated second-price
auctions, VCG auctions and general market strategies.
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8 Appendix
Lemma 2. The function g : γ 7→ log
1
γ
1−γ is decreasing over the interval (0, 1).
Proof. This can be straightforwardly established:
g′(γ) =
− 1−γγ + log 1γ
(1− γ)2 =
γ log
(
1− [1− 1γ ])− (1− γ)
γ(1− γ)2 <
(1− γ)− (1− γ)
γ(1− γ)2 = 0,
using the inequality log(1− x) < −x valid for all x < 0.
Lemma 3. Let a ≥ 0 and let g : D ⊂ R → [a,∞) be a decreasing and differentiable function.
Then, the function F : R→ R defined by
F (γ) = g(γ)−
√
g(γ)2 − b
is increasing for all values of b ∈ [0, a].
Proof. We will show that F ′(γ) ≥ 0 for all γ ∈ D. Since F ′ = g′[1 − g(g2 − b)−1/2] and g′ ≤ 0
by hypothesis, the previous statement is equivalent to showing that
√
g2 − b ≤ g which is trivially
verified since b ≥ 0.
Theorem 1. Let 1/2 < γ < γ0 < 1 and r∗ =
⌈
argminr≥1 r +
γr0T
(1−γ0)(1−γr0 )
⌉
. For any v ∈ [0, 1],
if T > 4, the regret of PFSr∗ satisfies
Reg(PFSr∗ , v) ≤ (2vγ0Tγ0 log cT + 1 + v)(log2 log2 T + 1) + 4Tγ0 ,
where c = 4 log 2.
Proof. It is not hard to verify that the function r 7→ r + γr0T(1−γ0)(1−γr0 ) is convex and approaches
infinity as r → ∞. Thus, it admits a minimizer r¯∗ whose explicit expression can be found by
solving the following equation
0 =
d
dr
(
r +
γr0T
(1− γ0)(1− γr0)
)
= 1 +
γr0T log γ0
(1− γ0)(1− γr0)2
.
Solving the corresponding second-degree equation yields
γr¯
∗
0 =
2 + T log(1/γ0)1−γ0 −
√(
2 + T log(1/γ0)1−γ0
)2
− 4
2
=: F (γ0).
By Lemmas 2 and 3, the function F thereby defined is increasing. Therefore, γr¯
∗
0 ≤ limγ0→1 F (γ0)
and
γr¯
∗
0 ≤
2 + T −√(2 + T )2 − 4
2
=
4
2(2 + T +
√
(2 + T )2 − 4) ≤
2
T
. (8)
By the same argument, we must have γr¯
∗
0 ≥ F (1/2), that is
γr¯
∗
0 ≥ F (1/2) =
2 + 2T log 2−√(2 + 2T log 2)2 − 4
2
=
4
2(2 + 2T log 2 +
√
(2 + 2T log 2)2 − 4)
≥ 2
4 + 4T log 2
≥ 1
4T log 2
.
Thus,
r∗ = dr¯∗e ≤ log(1/F (1/2))
log(1/γ0)
+ 1 ≤ log(4T log 2)
log 1/γ0
+ 1. (9)
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Combining inequalities (8) and (9) with (7) gives
Reg(PFSr∗ , v) ≤
(
v
log(4T log 2)
log 1/γ0
+ 1 + v
)
(dlog2 log2 T e+ 1) +
(1 + γ0)T
(1− γ0)(T − 2)
≤ (2vγ0Tγ0 log(cT ) + 1 + v)(dlog2 log2 T e+ 1) + 4Tγ0 ,
using the inequality log( 1γ ) ≥ 1−γ2γ valid for all γ ∈ (1/2, 1).
8.1 Lower bound for monotone algorithms
Lemma 4. Let (pt)Tt=1 be a decreasing sequence of prices. Assume that the seller faces a truthful
buyer. Then, if v is sampled uniformly at random in the interval [ 12 , 1], the following inequality
holds:
E[κ∗] ≥ 1
32E[v − pκ∗ ] .
Proof. Since the buyer is truthful, κ∗(v) = κ if and only if v ∈ [pκ, pκ−1]. Thus, we can write
E[v − pκ∗ ] =
κmax∑
κ=2
E
[
1v∈[pκ,pκ−1](v − pκ)
]
=
κmax∑
κ=2
∫ pκ−1
pκ
(v − pκ) dv =
κmax∑
κ=2
(pκ−1 − pκ)2
2
,
where κmax = κ∗( 12 ). Thus, by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we can write
E
[
κ∗∑
κ=2
pκ−1 − pκ
]
≤ E

√√√√κ∗ κ∗∑
κ=2
(pκ−1 − pκ)2

≤ E
√√√√κ∗ κmax∑
κ=2
(pκ−1 − pκ)2

= E
[√
2κ∗E[v − pκ∗ ]
]
≤
√
E[κ∗]
√
2E[v − p∗κ],
where the last step holds by Jensen’s inequality. In view of that, since v > pκ∗ , it follows that:
3
4
= E[v] ≥ E[pκ∗ ] = E
[
κ∗∑
κ=2
pκ − pκ−1
]
+ p1 ≥ −
√
E[κ∗]
√
2E[v − pκ∗ ] + 1.
Solving for E[κ∗] concludes the proof.
The following lemma characterizes the value of κ∗ when facing a strategic buyer.
Lemma 5. For any v ∈ [0, 1], κ∗ satisfies v − pκ∗ ≥ Cκ∗γ (pκ∗ − pκ∗+1) with Cκ
∗
γ =
γ−γT−κ∗+1
1−γ .
Furthermore, when κ∗ ≤ 1+√TγT and T ≥ Tγ + 2 log(2/γ)log(1/γ) , Cκ∗γ can be replaced by the universal
constant Cγ = γ2(1−γ) .
Proof. Since an optimal strategy is played by the buyer, the surplus obtained by accepting a price
at time κ∗ must be greater than the corresponding surplus obtained when accepting the first price at
time κ∗ + 1. It thus follows that:
T∑
t=κ∗
γt−1(v − pκ∗) ≥
T∑
t=κ∗+1
γt−1(v − pκ∗+1)
⇒ γκ∗−1(v − pκ∗) ≥
T∑
t=κ∗+1
γt−1(pκ∗ − pκ∗+1) = γ
κ∗ − γT
1− γ (pκ∗ − pκ∗+1).
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Dividing both sides of the inequality by γκ
∗−1 yields the first statement of the lemma. Let us
verify the second statement. A straightforward calculation shows that the conditions on T imply
T −√TTγ ≥ log(2/γ)log(1/γ) , therefore
Cκ
∗
γ ≥
γ − γT−
√
TγT
1− γ ≥
γ − γ log(2/γ)log(1/γ)
1− γ =
γ − γ2
1− γ =
γ
2(1− γ) .
Proposition 5. For any convex decreasing sequence (pt)Tt=1, if T ≥ Tγ + 2 log(2/γ)log(1/γ) , then there
exists a valuation v0 ∈ [ 12 , 1] for the buyer such that
Reg(Am, v0) ≥ max
1
8
√
T −
√
T ,
√√√√Cγ(T −√TγT)(1
2
−
√
Cγ
T
) = Ω(√T +√CγT ).
Proof. In view of Proposition 1, we only need to verify that there exists v0 ∈ [ 12 , 1] such that
Reg(Am, v0) ≥
√√√√Cγ(T −√TγT)(1
2
−
√
Cγ
T
)
.
Let κmin = κ∗(1), and κmax = κ∗( 12 ). If κmin > 1 +
√
TγT , then Reg(Am, 1) ≥ 1 +
√
TγT , from
which the statement of the proposition can be derived straightforwardly. Thus, in the following we
will only consider the case κmin ≤ 1+
√
TγT . Since, by definition, the inequality 12 ≥ pκmax holds,
we can write
1
2
≥ pκmax =
κmax∑
κ=κmin+1
(pκ − pκ−1) + pκmin ≥ κmax(pκmin+1 − pκmin) + pκmin ,
where the last inequality holds by the convexity of the sequence and the fact that pκmin − pκmin−1 ≤
0. The inequality is equivalent to pκmin − pκmin+1 ≥ pκmin−
1
2
κmax
. Furthermore, by Lemma 5, we have
max
v∈[ 12 ,1]
Reg(Am, v) ≥ max (κmax, (T − κmin)(pκmin − pκmin+1))
≥ max
(
κmax, Cγ
(T − κmin)(pκmin − 12 )
κmax
)
.
The right-hand side is minimized for κmax =
√
Cγ(T − κmin)(pκmin − 12 ). Thus, there exists a
valuation v0 for which the following inequality holds:
Reg(Am, v0) ≥
√
Cγ(T − κmin)
(
pκmin −
1
2
)
≥
√
Cγ
(
T −√TγT)(pκmin − 12).
Furthermore, we can assume that pκmin ≥ 1 −
√
Cγ
T otherwise Reg(Am, 1) ≥ (T − 1)
√
Cγ/T ,
which is easily seen to imply the desired lower bound. Thus, there exists a valuation v0 such that
Reg(Am, v0) ≥
√√√√Cγ(T −√TγT)(1
2
−
√
Cγ
T
)
,
which concludes the proof.
9 Simulations
Here, we present the results of more extensive simulations for PFSr and the monotone algorithm.
Again, we consider two different scenarios. Figure 3 shows the experimental results for an agnostic
scenario where the value of the parameter γ remains unknown to both algorithms and where the
parameter r of PFSr is set to log(T ). The results reported in Figure 4 correspond to the second
scenario where the discounting factor γ is known to the algorithms and where the parameter β for
the monotone algorithm is set to 1−1/√TTγ . The scale on the plots is logarithmic in the number
of rounds and in the regret.
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Figure 3: Regret curves for PFSr and monotone for different values of v and γ. The value of γ is
not known to the algorithms.
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Figure 4: Regret curves for PFSr and monotone for different values of v and γ. The value of γ is
known to both algorithms.
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